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
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

14 APR 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Zbigniew Brzezinski
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

SUBJECT : Soviet Activities Affecting US
Interests

This is the fourth in a series of reports that chart the USSR's actions to advance their interests abroad. It gives special attention to those activities that either seem deliberately designed to counter US policy or have the potential for developing into issues inimical to US interests.



Bruce C. Clarke, Jr.

Attachment:
As stated

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
National Foreign Assessment Center

15 April 1980

MEMORANDUM

Soviet Activities Affecting US Interests [redacted]

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Summary

The USSR's determination to contain US efforts to criticize the invasion of Afghanistan, boycott the summer Olympics, and limit the transfer of grain and technology to the Soviet Union has led to sharper Soviet criticism of the US and tougher Soviet behavior on a variety of foreign policy issues. The Soviets have apparently chosen to go on the offensive as far as US interests are concerned; Moscow has stepped up its criticism of President Carter and US allies such as the FRG's Chancellor Schmidt and Turkey's Prime Minister Demirel. They have also responded negatively to NATO on theater nuclear force (TNF) modernization, which is part of a larger Soviet effort to capitalize on differences between the US and its West European allies. [redacted]

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At the same time, the Soviets are trying to create the impression that they are capable of mending their fences with the PRC and are in complete unity with European communist parties on larger foreign policy matters involving detente and disarmament. These steps are designed to allow the

This memorandum was prepared by the USSR-East European Division of the Office of Political Analysis. Comments may be addressed to [redacted]

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Copy 17 of 21

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Soviets to limit the damage caused by their invasion of Afghanistan, to present themselves as more forthcoming on disarmament issues than the US, and to challenge US interests in those areas in the Third World that are politically and psychologically far removed from Afghanistan. [redacted]

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The Soviets would like to divert international attention from their presence in Afghanistan by focusing on and undermining US support for the Egyptian-Israeli peace process. The USSR is likely to campaign more actively against the Camp David process, Israel, and President Sadat. The Soviets will try to capitalize on recent signs of US-West European differences over recognition of the Palestine Liberation Organization and criticism of continued Israeli settlements on Arab territory. The Soviets will also try to undercut Western influence in Southern Africa and to increase support for South African liberation movements, particularly the Namibian liberation movement based in Angola. Another Soviet option could be to increase the Cuban presence in the Third World, which could raise the temperature for the US in the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula. [redacted]

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Signs of Soviet Truculence in the Wake of Afghanistan

The Soviet decision to invade Afghanistan was taken at the expense of previous Soviet policy interests vis-a-vis the US and Western Europe. In the wake of the Soviet invasion, the Soviets have become more firm in rejecting NATO's proposal for arms control talks involving TNF, more vague in their willingness to comply with the terms of SALT II, and more willing to respond measure for measure to US defense plans. In

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[redacted] The Soviets have also taken a much harsher line in public and private against such US allies as West Germany, Norway, and Turkey in order to diminish support for Washington's anti-Soviet line, to intensify frictions between the US and its NATO allies, and to undermine US efforts to coordinate condemnation of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. [redacted]

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In an effort to silence domestic criticism on a variety of issues, the Soviets are turning the screws on their internal critics, particularly the dissidents, Jews, and other "undesirable elements," that Moscow handled more carefully when it had a greater equity in detente with the US. These efforts are designed to stifle contacts

[redacted]

between dissidents and Westerners, and to destroy the domestic appeal of the dissidents by depicting them as creatures of US interests. The use of the KGB to control internal dissidence and the blatantly anti-Semitic aspect of the harassment of the dissidents--most of whom are also Jewish activists--suggests that reactionary forces within the leadership are asserting themselves in order to inhibit increased cooperation with the West. This activity has a xenophobic aspect that suggests more than an effort to get rid of Moscow's troublemakers before the Olympic games. [redacted]

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Future Opportunities to Challenge US Interests

Soviet officials have remarked privately that they see no hope for any upturn in US-USSR relations before 1981 at the earliest and have painted a picture of US leaders and policies that make the prospect of renewed cooperation in the near future appear highly unlikely. In their speeches during the Supreme Soviet election campaign, Politburo members Suslov and Gromyko questioned the reliability of the Carter administration as a negotiating partner by accusing it of repeatedly violating international agreements. Soviet leaders had little to say about SALT II and nothing at all about subsequent strategic arms limitation negotiations with the US. Moscow could decide that it prefers to be free of certain SALT II restraints in any new environment of heightened competition with the US. [redacted]

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Current Soviet policy in the Third World has not been helpful to US interests, but it could be worse if Moscow decides to become more active in the Middle East and Africa. The Soviets will probably try to campaign more actively against the Camp David process and to isolate Sadat in the Arab community. Moscow's recent support for an expanded French role in the Arab-Israeli peacekeeping effort was obviously part of an effort to divide Western opinion in the wake of Afghanistan and to support the notion of Palestinian self-determination. [redacted]

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If the Soviets are ultimately unable to reinsert themselves into the peace process, then they could turn to a more destructive role over Middle East peacekeeping, including a veto over the upcoming renewal of UNIFIL's mandate which could damage the prospects of a return to stability in Lebanon and increase tensions between Syria and Israel. The Soviets could also work against Israel at the UN, where Moscow's Security Council seat would be leverage in the

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support of Arab efforts to sanction Israel. [REDACTED]

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Although the Soviets may become interested in increasing tensions in the Middle East, an Iraqi-Iranian clash would not necessarily be in Moscow's interests. Such a confrontation would distract Tehran's attention from Iran's intensified clash with the US, could lead to Iraqi seizure of the oil fields in Khuzestan, and would complicate Moscow's efforts to balance relations with the two countries. Nevertheless, the Soviets would try to exploit Iraqi-Iranian frictions over the long term on the basis of Baghdad's dependency on the USSR for military aid and Tehran's decreased ability to deal with its own leftist political forces and a Soviet threat on its borders. [REDACTED]

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There are other Third World situations where the Soviets have opportunities for meddling, particularly in Cyprus due to the recent failure of the Greek and Turkist communities to narrow their differences and in Southern Africa if the initiative of the Western Five for a Namibia settlement should collapse. Any failure to arrange a settlement for Namibia would also bring about a strong demand for sanctions against South Africa, which would place the Soviets in a favorable position in the UN against Western interests. In the near term, the Soviets will probably press Angola and Mozambique to refrain from expanding economic ties with the West and Zambia to accept increased Soviet military aid. Another Soviet option would be to step up the Cuban presence in Africa in order to raise the temperature in the area. [REDACTED]

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The Soviets may also be tempted to challenge US interests more aggressively in Central America and Caribbean, either directly in Nicaragua and El Salvador or through Cuba in Jamaica and Grenada. Cuba's current economic and social unrest gives the Soviets additional leverage over Fidel Castro, and the price of continued Soviet economic and military support could very well be more Cuban meddling. The Soviets themselves have already laid the basis for an expansion of relations with Nicaragua, including trade, cultural, commercial and party ties. Defense Minister Ustinov's presence during recent high-level Soviet-Nicaraguan ceremonials indicates that military matters may have been

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[redacted]

on the agenda as well. Moscow is already in a position to exploit the leftist leanings of the Nicaraguan leadership and the Cuban influence in Nicaragua. [redacted]

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The Soviets are having a certain amount of success in Latin American states formerly identified with US interests.

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[redacted]

Soviet grain purchases from Argentina remain high, and there has been increased cooperation on a variety of commercial matters, particularly involving fishing agreements.

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[redacted]

[redacted] The Soviets are trying to increase trade with Brazil with special emphasis on those Brazilian exports that could replace items no longer available from the US.

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-- The Soviets may be on the verge of a military assistance arrangement with Mexico in view of the Mexican army's call for volunteers to study Russian. Politburo candidate member Demichev led a delegation to Mexico last week.

The Soviets have approached Mexico and other nonaligned members of the Security Council about calling a SC session to discuss US policy in the trust territory of the Pacific Islands. Moscow has threatened in the past to raise this issue at the SC, but has never raised it formally [redacted]

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Soviet "Peace Offensive" Likely

Since the Soviets see little prospect for progress on disarmament with the US until 1981 and perceive the West Europeans as unwilling to follow the US lead over Afghanistan, Moscow will probably concentrate on Europe to pursue a "peace offensive" and to persuade Western leaders and public opinion to forget Afghanistan. This offensive will have at least three facets.

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- This month's session (April 28-29) of loyal European communist parties will be used to rally support for a variety of detente-oriented issues and to distract attention from Afghanistan. The session will be tainted somewhat by the expected absence of representatives from the Yugoslav, Italian, and Spanish communist parties.
- Next month's twenty-fifth anniversary meeting of the Warsaw Pact will probably record a renewed push on European security matters, particularly the Warsaw Pact proposal for a conference on military detente and disarmament (CMD). The CMD proposal concentrates on confidence-building measures that the Soviets view as a response to West European efforts to engage the USSR on a broadened discussion of military detente in Europe.
- The Soviets will keep alive the idea of a CSCE review conference in Madrid later this year, which they will use to gain approval of their CMD proposal.

In this way, the Soviets hope to revive discussion of detente in Europe and to present themselves as willing to engage in East-West negotiations on a broad range of security and disarmament issues in a variety of forums. The Soviets would hope that a rejuvenation of detente would stiffen resistance in NATO to Washington's efforts to deploy TNF, to increase defense spending, and to embarrass the Soviets over Afghanistan. The Soviets view Europe as the key political arena for portraying the US as the major obstacle to political and military detente and the USSR as more forthcoming on disarmament.

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